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Introduction
fter every clash of arms, it is important to review the actual application
of the laws of armed conflict, especially the jus in bello. The NATO
campaign in Kosovo is no exception and, as allied forces were accused of hav-
ing committed various violations of the law of armed conflict, examining what
happened in Kosovo is particularly valuable. While the Prosecutor for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia conducted a prelim-
inary inquiry into NATO’s actions and concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to conduct a formal investigation, there remained significant con-
cerns in the international community over the lawfulness of NATO’s actions.
Moreover, even if NATO did comply with the laws of armed conflict, are
those laws properly suited for today’s high-technology battlefield and do they
encourage the maintenance of international peace and security? These issues
warranted examination by scholars in the fields of both ethics and interna-
tional law.
For over one hundred years, the United States Naval War College has com-
mitted itself to combining a scholarly understanding of the laws of war with an
appreciation for and insight into the perspective of the warfighter—the one
who must apply those laws to the battlefield. As such, the Naval War College
was uniquely suited to convene an array of scholars and practitioners to exam-
ine the legal and ethical lessons of NATO’s Kosovo campaign. We are in-
debted to Lieutenant Andru Wall of the International Law Department
faculty for the energy and enthusiasm he displayed in organizing our confer-
ence and in editing this volume of the International Law Studies (Blue Book)
series. Well done!
Special thanks also are due to Yoram Dinstein and the Israel Yearbook on
Human Rights, Joel Rosenthal and the Carnegie Council on Ethics & Interna-
tional Affairs, John Norton Moore and Bob Turner and the Center for Na-
tional Security Law at the University of Virginia, and Scott Silliman and the
Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security at the Duke University School
of Law. Without their co-sponsorship and invaluable assistance the collo-
quium and this Blue Book would not have been possible.
Funding for this book and the colloquium was also provided by Dean
Alberto R. Coll, Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War College.
His leadership and support are key to the Blue Book series. Invaluable contri-
butions were also made by Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC, USN (Ret.), who
volunteered many hours of his personal time in reviewing manuscripts and of-
fering advice. Further assistance was provided by the rest of the faculty and
staff of the International Law Department and our associated reserve unit.
Volume 78 will serve as a standard reference work of case studies in this
area, continuing the solid, scholarly tradition of the “Blue Books.” The series
is published by the Naval War College and distributed throughout the world
to academic institutions, libraries, and both U.S. and foreign military
commands.
DENNIS MANDSAGER






hen an international group of military officers, judges, political sci-
entists, philosophers, historians and lawyers gathered at the United
States Naval War College in early August 2001 to discuss the legal and ethical
lessons to be learned from NATO’s Kosovo campaign, no one could have
imagined the horrific attacks that would take place in the United States just
one month later. Much of the discussion centered on whether Operation
Allied Force represented a new kind of war—what many term humanitarian
intervention—or simply an aberration with limited lessons for the future. Some
suggested that Kosovo was nothing like the battlefields of the future would be,
and so the lessons to be gleaned would be of limited use.
There is no question that the global war on terrorism that the United States
and its allies throughout the world are actively engaged in at the time of this
writing is dramatically different from Operation Allied Force. Most signifi-
cantly, the war on terrorism is a conflict fought primarily against non-State
actors and the States that aid, harbor, or support them, while the war over
Kosovo was more traditionally fought against a sovereign State. Some scholars
mused over whether humanitarian intervention wasn’t really war at all, yet it
was, classically stated, a matter of politics by another means. A group of sover-
eign States (NATO) used military force in order to impose their political will
(the cessation of the oppression of Kosovar Albanians) on another sovereign
State (Serbia).
The goal of the colloquium was to examine how the law of armed conflict
should be applied in modern warfare—focusing not just on the law, but also
the crucial operational perspective of the warfighter. As Judge James E. Baker
pointed out during his keynote luncheon address, the law of armed conflict is
not for the specialist, it is not for the lawyer; it must be capable of application
at the tactical level by the most junior of military personnel.1 As Professor
Dolzer’s wisely cautions: “We are living through a period of fundamental
changes in the laws of armed conflict, and it is important that the implication
of all these changes are thought through in a broad debate where the require-
ments of criminal law are discussed, where the realities of military conduct are
taken into account and where not only the noble humanitarian aspirations in
an isolated sense are highlighted.”2
The theme of the colloquium and, thus, this volume, is simply that while
the politics and the modalities of force employed in Kosovo may have been
unique, the legal and ethical lessons to be learned are applicable to any inter-
national armed conflict. So what are the jus in bello lessons to be learned from
Operation Allied Force? First, the law of armed conflict applies to any clash of
arms between two or more States. Secondly, only military objectives may be
lawfully targeted and they are defined within the temporal context of the
given conflict. Thirdly, the principle of proportionality prohibits excessive col-
lateral damage, yet the law does not impose absolute rules regarding imple-
mentation of weapons and tactics. Fourthly, despite the proliferation of
treaties on the law of armed conflict, customary international law will con-
tinue to define major elements and interpretations of the law of armed con-
flict. Thus, it is essential that the development and determination of
customary international law be properly understood and the continuing rele-
vance of state practice be fully appreciated.
The Applicability of the Law of Armed Conflict
1. The existence of an international armed conflict
While there was some debate contemporaneous with the Kosovo campaign
over whether “humanitarian intervention” triggered the applicability of the
law of armed conflict, Professor Christopher Greenwood abruptly answers the
question without qualification: while there is no definition of international
armed conflict in any law of armed conflict treaty, it is agreed to be a factual
determination based on the existence of actual hostilities between two or
more States.3 This is irrespective of a declaration of war and of the justifica-
tion for the hostilities. An international armed conflict “exists from the first
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moment after an exchange of fire” between two States.4 Opinio juris supports
this, as NATO certainly believed the law of armed conflict was fully applica-
ble and defined and incorporated the legal limits on the use of force within
the NATO rules of engagement.5
2. The internationalization of an internal armed conflict
The more challenging question is whether intervention by outside States
(e.g., NATO) on behalf of an organized armed group within a State (e.g., the
Kosovo Liberation Army) “internationalizes” the conflict between that group
and the State it is in conflict with (e.g., Serbia). Professor Greenwood argues
that it does “only if there is a clear relationship between the non-governmental
party to the conflict and one of the States party to the international conflict.”6
In the present case, there was not a sufficient link between the KLA and
NATO to internationalize the conflict between the KLA and Serbia.7 As
such, the members of the KLA were not entitled to combatant immunity nor
were they entitled to prisoner of war status if captured.
3. The interdiction of maritime shipping
The issue of whether NATO could lawfully intercept and divert neutral
vessels carrying strategic commodities was a political question more than a le-
gal one. The “customary law of armed conflict still permits a State engaged in
an international armed conflict to prevent strategic commodities such as oil
from reaching its opponent by sea, even if carried by neutral flagged vessels.”8
The law of neutrality was not abolished by the UN Charter, but belligerent
rights still permit warring States to interdict shipping—even that from neutral
States.9 While not disputing the continuing viability of customary belligerent
rights, Professors Greenwood and Bring urge caution in applying them in the
post-UN Charter era.10 NATO chose not to interdict shipping bound for Ser-
bia, not because doing so would have been illegal, but because certain political
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leaders within the alliance were “trying to damp down expectations of the
level of violence” that would be applied.11
4. Is it the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law?
Professor Stein acknowledges the confusion created by “re-naming the
‘laws of war’ or ‘law of armed conflict’ as ‘international humanitarian law’ thus
blurring the distinction between ‘humanitarian’ and ‘human rights’ law.”12 For
Colonel Graham this “renaming” indicates that some people think that ele-
ments of human rights law are included in the law of armed conflict—a trou-
bling proposition for those who have to advise military commanders on their
legal obligations given that human rights law is much less well-defined than
the law of armed conflict.13 The US military prefers the term “law of armed
conflict” as its obligations are better understood and because, as a matter of
policy, the US military applies the law of armed conflict to all military opera-
tions regardless of their characterization.
Professors Bothe and Green, among others, engaged in a lively debate over
whether humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict, is lex specialis vis-à-vis
human rights law.14 A lex specialis implies the existence of a lex generalis. How-
ever, because many human rights treaties do not apply during armed conflicts,
it is incorrect to label human rights law a lex generalis and the law of armed
conflict a lex specialis. They are two separate bodies of international law with,
at times and depending on the treaties a State is party to, overlapping
jurisdiction.
The drafters of Protocol I and other more recent law of armed conflict treaties
did draw from the realm of human rights law and incorporated certain human
rights concepts into the law of armed conflict. What must remain clear is that
these concepts are then implemented from the standpoint of the law of armed
conflict. Where there is overlapping jurisdiction and the actions of a military
commander are subject to review under both human rights law and the law of
armed conflict, then the greater specificity of the latter must be determinative.
5. Is there a link between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello?
It is a well-established maxim that the law of armed conflict applies equally
to both sides of a conflict, although some have argued that there may be a rela-
tionship between the degree of force that may be used and the “purpose for
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which force is permitted under the jus ad bellum.”15 Professor Bothe agrees that
the “jus ad bellum and jus in bello have to be kept separate” because the equality
of the parties is an essential precondition to the objective application of the law
of armed conflict, however, he proffers the caveat that “[m]ilitary advan-
tage . . . is a contextual notion.”16 This, to Professor Von Heinegg, amounts to
simply paying “lip service” to the principle that the two bodies of law are sepa-
rate.17 He counters that “the overall aim that led one of the parties to an armed
conflict to resort to the use of armed force is irrelevant when it comes to the
question whether certain objects effectively contribute to military action of the
adversary or whether their neutralization offers a definite military advantage.”18
Professor Greenwood emphatically rejects the “heresy” that NATO’s hu-
manitarian motives entitled it to greater latitude in choosing targets and the
“rival heresy” that “because the campaign was fought for a humanitarian ob-
jective, international humanitarian law has to be interpreted as imposing
upon NATO more extensive restrictions than would otherwise have been the
case.”19 Both these “heretical” views “involve an unjustified muddling of jus ad
bellum and jus in bello issues in a way which is contrary to principle and unsup-
ported by authority.”20
“The law of armed conflict does not ask for motives, political aims, or the
legality of the first use of force,” Professor Von Heinegg states: “[i]t takes as a
fact that the jus ad bellum has failed to function properly.”21 Any time consid-
eration of the jus ad bellum plays a role in the jus in bello, the latter is weak-
ened.22 Even if violations of the jus in bello can justify intervention as some
have argued, that remains a matter of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello re-
mains equally binding on both parties in any resulting hostilities.23
Nevertheless, Professor Bothe identifies this as the “fundamental issue:
how far does the context of the military operation have an impact on the no-
tion of military advantage?”24 In this regard, Professor Müllerson points out
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that the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on Nuclear
Weapons “created a novelty distinguishing between ‘an extreme circumstance
of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake’ and
other circumstances.”25 This implies that “a wrong done in light of jus ad
bellum has an impact on the jus in bello” applicable in the resulting conflict, be-
cause an aggressor would not be entitled to argue that it was acting under such
“extreme circumstance of self-defense.”26
Notwithstanding the ICJ’s advisory opinion, “it remains certain that all par-
ties have to equally abide by the requirements of jus in bello” and in “that sense
these branches of the law are separate.”27 If there is a “bridge between the two
branches of international law” it “is the requirement of adequacy” because “an
act justified by the necessity of humanitarian intervention must be limited by
that necessity and kept clearly within it.”28 In the final analysis, it is important
to distinguish between political or moral reasons for applying a “maximum
standard” of compliance with the law of armed conflict, and a legal obligation
to do so.29
Targeting Military Objectives
1. Defining military objectives
Perhaps the most fundamental principle of the law of armed conflict is that
of distinction. Professor Michael Bothe traces the development of the princi-
ple of distinction from Jean Jacques Rousseau’s conception of the sovereign’s
war. War is between States and their rulers, not their peoples, thus conflict
should be limited to combatants and military objectives.30 Article 52(2) of
Protocol I contains the “binding definition of military objective:”31
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
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While there should “be no doubt” that this definition “corresponds to exist-
ing principles as reflected in customary law and simply clarifies them,” some of
the clarifications could be “open to different interpretations of the scope of
the obligations imposed on the attacker” and, thus, “incompatible with a con-
sideration of the provision as fully reflecting customary international law.”32
Judge Pocar offers as examples of imprecise clarifications the expressions “ef-
fective contribution to military action” and “definite military advantage.”33
“The difficulty of the Article 52(2) definition” of military objective, Profes-
sor Bothe writes, “is its general character” particularly with respect to
“dual-use objects.”34 Professor Dinstein is “not enamored” by the phrase “dual
use” and argues that legally the fact that an object may have both a military
use and a civilian use does “not alter its singular and unequivocal status as a
military objective.”35
Professor Bothe asks how “the general principle of distinction” can be ren-
dered “more concrete in order to have secure standards for targeting” and
then agrees that an illustrative list of military objectives could be a possible solu-
tion.36 Professor Dinstein proffers that “only a composite definition—combining
an abstract statement with a non-exhaustive catalogue of illustrations—can
effectively avoid vagueness, on the one hand, and inability to anticipate future
scenarios, on the other.”37 The likelihood of States ever reaching agreement
on such a list, however useful, is doubtful. Given what Professor Dinstein him-
self identifies as the “temporal framework” within which military objectives
are defined—what may be legitimately attacked at one time may not be at an-
other time—a list could include objects which by their “nature” are military
objectives, but would not likely include the myriad of objects that become mil-
itary objectives by their location, purpose or use.38
2. Presuming civilian purpose
While the general definition of military objective contained in Article
52(2) of Protocol I can be considered customary international law, it is doubt-
ful that the same can be said about the requirement to assume civilian purpose
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contained in Article 52(3).39 This was an issue that was much debated during
the drafting process and some argue that it “may reflect a ‘[r]efusal to recog-
nize the realities of combat’ in some situations.”40 Professor Dinstein points
out, however, that the presumption only arises in cases of doubt regarding the
civilian purpose. “The degree of doubt that has to exist prior to the emergence
of the (rebuttable) presumption is by no means clear. But surely that doubt
has to exist in the mind of the attacker, based upon ‘the circumstances ruling
at the time.’”41
3. Effects-based targeting
The target selection and review process in Operational Allied Force was
premised on “effects based targeting,” which articulates a desired objective,
then seeks to identify “specific links, nodes, or objects” that, if attacked, will
achieve the objective.42 Judge Baker warned of “the impending collision
among the law of armed conflict, the doctrine of effects-based targeting, and a
shared desire to limit collateral casualties and consequences to the fullest
extent possible.”43 The focus of the collaborative targeting sessions seems to
validate Judge Bakers fears, as they “revolved around three issues: 1) the link-
age to military effects—the key to obtaining legal approval, 2) the collateral
damage estimate, and 3) the unintended civilian casualty estimate.”44
“[E]ffects-based targeting and the law of armed conflict may be on a collision
course” with respect to critical infrastructure, particularly factories owned
by supporters of regimes that could be quickly converted to military use.45
A focus on desired effects could lead military commanders to target certain
objects for effect, rather than because of their “effective contribution to mili-
tary action.”
4. Presidential review of targets
Contrary to popular belief, the president of the United States did not re-
view and approve all targets, but rather a “smaller subset” of the 200–300
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targets that were reviewed by the National Security Council.46 Traditional
military objectives were approved in theater, while military industrial, electric
power grid, critical infrastructure, and targets with a high likelihood of collat-
eral damage were reviewed by the Pentagon. Of these, maybe ten targets were
submitted for presidential review every four to five days.47
Nevertheless, General Short believes there was too much involvement by
civilians in the targeting process. He argues that because targets were chosen
by civilians rather than by military officers, NATO “bombed targets that were
frankly inappropriate for bringing Milosevic to the table.”48 General Short asks
“whose responsibility should targeting be?” Answering his own question, he
asserts that the president should restrict himself to selecting target sets and
leave it to “professional military officers” to select individual targets in accor-
dance with the strategic guidance and the law of armed conflict.49
5. Targeting the will of the people
The morale of the population and of the political decision-makers is not a
contribution to ‘military action.’ Thus, the advantage of softening the
adversary’s will to resist is not a ‘military’ one and, thus, cannot be used as a
legitimation for any targeting decision. If it were otherwise, it would be too easy
to legitimize military action which uses bombing just as a psychological
weapon—and there are other words for this.50
NATO did not target the will of the civilian population, but neither was it
so naive as to fail to see that there are valid military objectives that can be tar-
geted, a peripheral result of which will be to make the civilian population un-
happy with their leadership for choosing a course of action that allowed this to
happen.51 NATO did seek to impose “discomfort” on the civilian population,
but this was secondary to targeting lawful military objectives.52
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Collateral Damage and the Principle of Proportionality
1. The principle of proportionality
The principle of proportionality, while codified for the first time in Article
51(5)(b) of Protocol I, is one of the core principles of the customary law of
armed conflict. While the Protocol I formulation of proportionality may have
included specifications that cannot be found in prior declarations of the prin-
ciple, these “specifications are aimed at clarifying the scope . . . rather than at
adding new elements that would lead to the modification of their contents or
effects.”53 Simply put, the principle of proportionality prohibits attacks that
cause injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects “which is excessive in re-
lation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”54
The principle of proportionality rests on the presumption that the attacker
is complying with the principle of distinction, thus implicitly acknowledging
that some collateral damage is unavoidable.55 Yet many fail to recognize or
acknowledge this simple fact. Professor Dinstein agues that they make the
mistake of confusing extensive with excessive: “injury/damage to noncomba-
tants can be exceedingly extensive without being excessive, simply because
the military advantage anticipated is of paramount important.”56
“[S]ome have used Kosovo to advance a legal view that the law of armed
conflict virtually prohibits collateral casualties. This is an honorable and worthy
aspiration, but not the law. Nor should it be the law, or the tyrants of the
world will operate with impunity.”57 Professor Dinstein reminds us that “[o]ne
has to constantly bear in mind that war is war; not a chess game. There is al-
ways a price-tag in human suffering.”58 Rather than focusing on the unrealis-
tic goal of eliminating civilian casualties, the goal should be on their
mitigation—understanding their inevitability and the reality of mistakes, “ac-
cidents and just sheer bad luck.”59
The principle of proportionality was “the guiding principle of paramount
importance” for US forces during Operation Allied Force.60 “Concern for col-
lateral damage drove us to an extraordinary degree,” General Short states,
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“and it will drive the next generation of warriors even more so, because
whereas I see this as an extraordinary failure, the leadership within the NATO
senior administrations would say this was indeed an extraordinary success.”61
General Short emphasizes that NATO did its “very, very best to limit collat-
eral damage” but “[e]very time we failed in that effort, the reaction by political
leaders was hysterical.”62 The political leadership of NATO could not stand
collateral damage and “they did not understand war. They thought it was a
video game, and that no one ever dies. . . . Did you ever see anyone die in the
films from the Gulf War? I never did. I just saw crosshairs on a target in down-
town Baghdad, and then it blew up.”63
2. Responsibility for civilian casualties
There is a very real danger in misplacing responsibility for civilian casual-
ties. It is wrong to place “the entire responsibility for civilian casualties on the
party to the conflict that has the least control over them.”64 As an example,
Mr Parks argues that civilians “killed within an obvious military objective”
should not be counted as “collateral civilian casualties.”65 To count them as
such “would only encourage increased civilian presence in a military objective
in order to make its attack prohibitive in terms of collateral civilian casual-
ties.”66 In the same sense, placing too many targets off-limits because of the
presence of human shields would create the perverse effect of rewarding the
use of human shields.
3. The use of precision-guided munitions
Contrary to the arguments made by some, there is no obligation, in custom-
ary international law or treaty law, to use precision-guided munitions in at-
tacks on urban areas.67 Such a rule would be “dysfunctional” and a far better
standard would be “to rely on the judgment of the commander.”68 Nowhere in
the law of armed conflict is there a requirement to use specific weapons, rather
there is a legal standard of reasonableness that remains constant. A doctor in a
developing country has the same legal standard of care as a doctor in a
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developed country, but the doctor in the developed country may be expected
to perform more tests or expend more resources in order to properly treat his
patient. Mr Sandoz argues that this is an apt analogy to apply in analyzing the
reasonableness of a military commander’s choice of weapons.69 Yet one won-
ders whether this isn’t a false analogy. The doctor has no choice in whether to
treat his patient, yet the military commander always has a choice in whether
to target a particular military objective. If the commander does not have the
technological capability to attack the target without causing disproportionate
damage, then the law of armed conflict prohibits him from attacking it. Thus
the law simultaneously protects civilians and provides an incentive for the ac-
quisition of technology that increases the commanders freedom of action.
4. Flying above 15,000 feet
Collateral damage concerns must be balanced against “the risk that you are
asking your pilots to take.”70 Professor Murphy noted that NATO’s “decision
to engage in high-altitude bombing did not by itself constitute a violation of
the law of armed conflict.”71 Colonel Sorenson is more blunt: it “sells newspa-
pers, airtime and interviews, but the facts just simply aren’t there to suggest
that by keeping our pilots at 15,000 feet to protect them that we were engag-
ing in basically carpet bombing.”72
5. The environment
For those States that are party to Protocol I without reservation to Articles
35 and 56, causing damage to the environment is a war crime only if it reaches
“the triple cumulative threshold” of being “widespread, long-term and se-
vere.”73 Professor Bothe suggests that a lower threshold could be reached if the
“collateral environmental damage was excessive in relation to a military ad-
vantage anticipated.”74 However, Professor Von Heinegg counters that cus-
tomary international law would still not consider wanton destruction of the
environment a prosecutable war crime.75 Judge Pocar agrees noting that the
provisions have “no clear precedent in customary law.”76
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6. Collateral damage and future conflicts
Professor Bring asserts that NATO’s “no-body bags policy . . . implies that
the lives of your own pilots are worth more than the lives of the innocent civil-
ians on the ground.”77 Yet Professor Adam Roberts cautions that this desire to
protect one’s own servicemen was “entirely understandable” and, looking at
the speeches made by NATO leaders prior to the start of the air campaign, it
was not presumed going in to be a “no body bags war.”78 Those who argue that
NATO should have accepted an increase risk to their military service mem-
bers lose sight of the goals of democracy to stop democide, genocide, and ag-
gressive war. “The reality,” Professor John Norton Moore points out, is that
we want to achieve those goals “as rapidly as we possibly can at the lowest cost
to all involved.”79 By arguing that democracies must be willing to accept
greater risks to their personnel, proponents of humanitarian goals may in fact
raise barriers in a manner that would lead to increased suffering.
Professor Murphy closes his paper on collateral damage with the prescient
observation that future wars will increasingly see a “‘happy congruence’ be-
tween the needs of military efficiency and the avoidance of unnecessary injury
to civilian persons or property”; however, “the protections the law of armed
conflict affords to civilian persons and property are likely to be less and less ef-
fective in practice. This is because the technologically weaker States, as well
as terrorists or other non-governmental actors, may increasingly conclude
that they must attack the civilian population of the enemy State to offset the
latter’s great advantage in firepower.”80
Customary International Law and the Law of Armed Conflict
1. The Martens Clause
The Martens Clause, which was codified in the 1899 and 1907 Hague con-
ventions as well as the 1977 Additional Protocol I, recognizes the importance
of customary international law to the law of armed conflict. It reads:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the high contracting
parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
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established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the
requirements of the public conscience.81
“The Martens Clause,” Professor Shearer writes, “is a powerful reminder
that in situations of armed conflict, of whatever kind, there is never a total gap
in the law, never a situation in which there cannot be an appeal to law in order
to mitigate the horror and the suffering.”82 The powerful rhetoric invoking the
dictates of the public conscience should not be misunderstood as creating a
new source of customary international law, but rather as a safeguard thereof.
Anytime one discusses the application of the laws of armed conflict to new, or
perceived new, types of conflicts, it must never be forgotten that there is at the
very least customary law that regulates the application of military force.
Professor Dolzer notes that much of the “humanitarian law community”
emphasizes the “principles of humanity and . . . dictates of public conscience”
aspect of the Martens Clause, while the military tends to be primarily con-
cerned with the customary practice provision.83 This is understandable as cus-
tomary practice tends to be more easily defined, which is of primary
importance when potential criminal liability is at stake. The two approaches
should converge, however, upon the realization that the Martens Clause
encourages the view that customary international law is based not just on bat-
tlefield practice, but rather on opinio juris—battlefield practice combined with
a concurrent belief that it is lawful. It is upon the State’s subjective belief in
the legality of its actions that “the principles of humanity and dictates of pub-
lic conscience” weigh most heavily. In any event, no tribunal has ever
trumped customary law by resting an opinion on the “dictates of the public
conscience.”
2. The formulation of customary international law
Following the North Sea Continental Shelf case and the Nicaragua case,
“there is no doubt that for a rule to exist as a norm of customary international
law both its recognition as a legal obligation by States and the latter’s conduct
which is consistent with the rule are required.”84 The “cannon of principles
laid down in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice” are
as applicable to the law of armed conflict as they are to other areas of public
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international law.85 Thus, “[w]idespread practice and corresponding opinio
juris will be required for the formulation of customary law, with or without par-
allel treaty law.”86
The importance of State practice cannot be overstated as this is the first of
the three components of customary law listed in the Martens Clause.87 How-
ever, equally important is the corresponding opinio juris. On this point it must
be noted that many of the steps taken by the United States during Operation
Allied Force to limit collateral damage were taken because they could be
taken, not because there was any sense of a legal obligation to do so. Thus,
these actions provide little in the way of clarifying customary international
law.88 The “positivist approach” taken by the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice in the Lotus case, which argues that “restrictions on the practice
of States cannot be presumed,” may be “particularly well-suited to issues of the
law of armed conflict, which, by their very nature, implicate the vital interests
of States.”89
Professor Stein observes that the International Court of Justice and the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have looked
beyond traditional sources for “evidence” of customary international law,
which the ICTY said could include “the number of ratifications to interna-
tional treaties and the dictates of military manuals.”90 However, a “long list of
signatories” has very little to do with determining State practice in the area of
the law of armed conflict because the “vast majority of signatories of Protocol
I are at best interested observers—bystanders if you will—when it comes to
the actual application of the law of armed conflict in combat situations.”91
On the issue of the precedential value of international case law, Judge
Pocar writes:
[I]t has to be stressed that previous decisions of international courts cannot be
relied on as having the authority of precedents in order to establish a principle of
law. The current structure of the international community, which clearly lacks a
hierarchical judicial system, does not allow consideration of judicial precedent
as a distinct source of law. Therefore, prior case law may only constitute
evidence of a customary rule in that it may reflect the existence of opinio juris
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and international practice, but cannot be regarded per se as having precedential
authority in international criminal jurisdiction.92
Finally, the traditional rules protecting the persistent objector still allow a
State to protect itself from a developing norm it finds objectionable.93
3. The customary nature of provisions of Protocol I
It is “undisputed” that Protocol I in part reaffirms and clarifies customary
international law and in part develops that law.94 “For the first part [its] rules
bind all States, for the second only the State parties to the Protocols are
bound.”95 The “fundamental principles” of “distinction between civilians and
combatants, the prohibition against directly attacking civilians, and the rule
of proportionality, are customary international law,” Professor Stein writes,
but “it is very doubtful whether the same can be said about other provisions of
Protocol I—in particular those dealing with collateral damage.”96
Three points are important to this debate: 1) the status of a particular pro-
vision in Protocol I (whether it is new law or customary international law) may
change with time, 2) if the provision is customary international law, it is cus-
tomary international law that is binding “not the treaty provision as such” and
3) the codification process necessarily involves new or more precise elements
which must themselves be distinguished from the customary principle.97 In the
final analysis, “there is a trend in the increasing number of ratifications and
some case law in some international tribunals” towards recognition of Proto-
col I as customary law; however, there is also significant State practice involv-
ing the “major actors” that prevents consideration of many provisions of
Protocol I as customary international law.98
Reasonableness and Implementation of the Law of Armed Conflict
It has become a popular mantra for commentators to decry the perceived
increasing influence of lawyers over the planning and execution of military op-
erations. Yet, “[w]hether actors like it or not, Kosovo may serve as a harbinger
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of the manner in which specific US military actions—down to the tactical
sortie—will receive legal scrutiny, from non-governmental organizations, ad
hoc tribunals, and the International Criminal Court.”99 The concern, how-
ever, is not so much that military operations are subject to legal review, but
what standard will be applied in evaluating the wartime actions of military
commanders? Is it that of the reasonable man or the reasonable military com-
mander? As Professor Green wryly observes, a “reasonable man is the man on
a downtown bus; that is not the reasonable soldier.”100 Reasonableness during
times of armed conflict must be judged through the eyes of the man involved
in that armed conflict.
A particular challenge arises in the context of proportionality, the determi-
nation of which often gives rise to a “clash between the military and humani-
tarian ‘value genres’.”101 Can a “reasonable civilian” ever properly determine
military necessity and proportionality? Professor Bothe thinks they could with
proper training, but Professor Green is less confident that civilian judges could
ever appreciate “the circumstances that were prevailing at the time that led to
the soldier’s actions.”102 This, of course, raises the issue of whether civilian
judges should try military cases. Professor Ronzitti offers a solution by distin-
guishing between wartime crimes that are battlefield crimes (war crimes) and
those that are not (crimes against humanity and genocide). He suggests that
special chambers be established to hear the former.103
Conclusion
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JAGC, USN (Ret.) for his indefatigable editorial input and assistance.
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During my nearly three years here at the Naval War College, I have had the
privilege of learning from many of the greatest minds in international law, in-
cluding the contributors to this volume. The most recent holders of the
Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law, Ruth Wedgwood, Ivan
Shearer, Nicholas Rostow and Yoram Dinstein, have selflessly illuminated me
with their brilliance and guided me with their mentoring wisdom. For that I
am forever grateful.
A note of personal thanks to my grandfather, Earl Wall, whose words of
wisdom led me to pursue my dream of military service and, in turn, to discover
a passion for international law, and to my beautiful wife, Yashmin, whose un-
conditional love is a source of continual strength and encouragement. This
book is dedicated to their honor.
xxx
Preface
